

# SOFTWARE AND MIND

Andrei Sorin

EXTRACT

Chapter 8: *From Mechanism to Totalitarianism*  
Section *Totalitarian Democracy*

**This extract includes the book's front matter  
and part of chapter 8.**

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This section examines the totalitarian aspects of democratic societies, the mechanistic roots of this phenomenon, and the spread of software totalitarianism.

The entire book, each chapter separately, and also selected sections, can be viewed and downloaded at the book's website.

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SOFTWARE  
AND  
MIND

The Mechanistic Myth  
and Its Consequences

Andrei Sorin

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Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought?... Has it ever occurred to you ... that by the year 2050, at the very latest, not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are having now?

George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*



## Disclaimer

This book attacks the mechanistic myth, not persons. Myths, however, manifest themselves through the acts of persons, so it is impossible to discuss the mechanistic myth without also referring to the persons affected by it. Thus, all references to individuals, groups of individuals, corporations, institutions, or other organizations are intended solely as examples of mechanistic beliefs, ideas, claims, or practices. To repeat, they do not constitute an attack on those individuals or organizations, but on the mechanistic myth.

Except where supported with citations, the discussions in this book reflect the author's personal views, and the author does not claim or suggest that anyone else holds these views.

The arguments advanced in this book are founded, ultimately, on the principles of demarcation between science and pseudoscience developed by philosopher Karl Popper (as explained in "Popper's Principles of Demarcation" in chapter 3). In particular, the author maintains that theories which attempt to explain non-mechanistic phenomena mechanistically are pseudoscientific. Consequently, terms like "ignorance," "incompetence," "dishonesty," "fraud," "corruption," "charlatanism," and "irresponsibility," in reference to individuals, groups of individuals, corporations, institutions, or other organizations, are used in a precise, technical sense; namely, to indicate beliefs, ideas, claims, or practices that are mechanistic though applied to non-mechanistic phenomena, and hence pseudoscientific according to Popper's principles of demarcation. In other words, these derogatory terms are used solely in order to contrast our world to a hypothetical, ideal world, where the mechanistic myth and the pseudoscientific notions it engenders would not exist. The meaning of these terms, therefore, must not be confused with their informal meaning in general discourse, nor with their formal meaning in various moral, professional, or legal definitions. Moreover, the use of these terms expresses strictly the personal opinion of the author – an opinion based, as already stated, on the principles of demarcation.

This book aims to expose the corruptive effect of the mechanistic myth. This myth, especially as manifested through our software-related pursuits, is the greatest danger we are facing today. Thus, no criticism can be too strong. However, since we are all affected by it, a criticism of the myth may cast a negative light on many individuals and organizations who are practising it unwittingly. To them, the author wishes to apologize in advance.



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# Preface

The book's subtitle, *The Mechanistic Myth and Its Consequences*, captures its essence. This phrase is deliberately ambiguous: if read in conjunction with the title, it can be interpreted in two ways. In one interpretation, the mechanistic myth is the universal mechanistic belief of the last three centuries, and the consequences are today's software fallacies. In the second interpretation, the mechanistic myth is specifically today's mechanistic *software* myth, and the consequences are the fallacies *it* engenders. Thus, the first interpretation says that the past delusions have caused the current software delusions; and the second one says that the current software delusions are causing further delusions. Taken together, the two interpretations say that the mechanistic myth, with its current manifestation in the software myth, is fostering a process of continuous intellectual degradation – despite the great advances it made possible. This process started three centuries ago, is increasingly corrupting us, and may well destroy us in the future. The book discusses all stages of this degradation.

The book's epigraph, about Newspeak, will become clear when we discuss the similarity of language and software (see, for example, pp. 411–413).

Throughout the book, the software-related arguments are also supported with ideas from other disciplines – from philosophy, in particular. These discussions are important, because they show that our software-related problems

are similar, ultimately, to problems that have been studied for a long time in other domains. And the fact that the software theorists are ignoring this accumulated knowledge demonstrates their incompetence. Often, the connection between the traditional issues and the software issues is immediately apparent; but sometimes its full extent can be appreciated only in the following sections or chapters. If tempted to skip these discussions, remember that our software delusions can be recognized only when investigating the software practices from this broader perspective.

Chapter 7, on software engineering, is not just for programmers. Many parts (the first three sections, and some of the subsections in each theory) discuss the software fallacies in general, and should be read by everyone. But even the more detailed discussions require no previous programming knowledge. The whole chapter, in fact, is not so much about programming as about the delusions that pervade our programming practices. So this chapter can be seen as a special introduction to software and programming; namely, comparing their true nature with the pseudoscientific notions promoted by the software elite. This study can help both programmers and laymen to understand why the incompetence that characterizes this profession is an inevitable consequence of the mechanistic software ideology.

There is some repetitiveness in the book, deliberately introduced in order to make the individual chapters, and even the individual sections, reasonably independent. Thus, while the book is intended to be read from the beginning, you can select almost any portion and still follow the discussion. An additional benefit of the repetitions is that they help to explain the more complex issues, by presenting the same ideas from different perspectives or in different contexts.

The book is divided into chapters, the chapters into sections, and some sections into subsections. These parts have titles, so I will refer to them here as *titled* parts. Since not all sections have subsections, the lowest-level titled part in a given place may be either a section or a subsection. This part is, usually, further divided into *numbered* parts. The table of contents shows the titled parts. The running heads show the current titled parts: on the right page the lowest-level part, on the left page the higher-level one (or the same as the right page if there is no higher level). Since there are more than two hundred numbered parts, it was impractical to include them in the table of contents. Also, contriving a short title for each one would have been more misleading than informative. Instead, the first sentence or two in a numbered part serve also as a hint of its subject, and hence as title.

Figures are numbered within chapters, but footnotes are numbered within the lowest-level titled parts. The reference in a footnote is shown in full only the first time it is mentioned within such a part. If mentioned more than once,

in the subsequent footnotes it is usually abbreviated. For these abbreviations, then, the full reference can be found by searching the previous footnotes no further back than the beginning of the current titled part.

The statement “italics added” in a footnote indicates that the emphasis is only in the quotation. Nothing is stated in the footnote when the italics are present in the original text.

In an Internet reference, only the site’s main page is shown, even when the quoted text is from a secondary page. When undated, the quotations reflect the content of these pages in 2010 or later.

When referring to certain individuals (software theorists, for instance), the term “expert” is often used mockingly. This term, though, is also used in its normal sense, to denote the possession of true expertise. The context makes it clear which sense is meant.

The term “elite” is used to describe a body of companies, organizations, and individuals (for example, the software elite); and the plural, “elites,” is used when referring to several entities, or groups of entities, within such a body. Thus, although both forms refer to the same entities, the singular is employed when it is important to stress the existence of the whole body, and the plural when it is the existence of the individual entities that must be stressed. The plural is also employed, occasionally, in its normal sense – a group of several different bodies. Again, the meaning is clear from the context.

The issues discussed in this book concern all humanity. Thus, terms like “we” and “our society” (used when discussing such topics as programming incompetence, corruption of the elites, and drift toward totalitarianism) do not refer to a particular nation, but to the whole world.

Some discussions in this book may be interpreted as professional advice on programming and software use. While the ideas advanced in these discussions derive from many years of practice and from extensive research, and represent in the author’s view the best way to program and use computers, readers must remember that they assume all responsibility if deciding to follow these ideas. In particular, to apply these ideas they may need the kind of knowledge that, in our mechanistic culture, few programmers and software users possess. Therefore, the author and the publisher disclaim any liability for risks or losses, personal, financial, or other, incurred directly or indirectly in connection with, or as a consequence of, applying the ideas discussed in this book.

The pronouns “he,” “his,” “him,” and “himself,” when referring to a gender-neutral word, are used in this book in their universal, gender-neutral sense. (Example: “If an individual restricts himself to mechanistic knowledge, his performance cannot advance past the level of a novice.”) This usage, then, aims solely to simplify the language. Since their antecedent is gender-neutral (“everyone,” “person,” “programmer,” “scientist,” “manager,” etc.), the neutral

sense of the pronouns is established grammatically, and there is no need for awkward phrases like “he or she.” Such phrases are used in this book only when the neutrality or the universality needs to be emphasized.

It is impossible, in a book discussing many new and perhaps difficult concepts, to anticipate all the problems that readers may face when studying these concepts. So the issues that require further discussion will be addressed online, at [www.softwareandmind.com](http://www.softwareandmind.com). In addition, I plan to publish there material that could not be included in the book, as well as new ideas that may emerge in the future. Finally, in order to complement the arguments about traditional programming found in the book, I plan to publish, in source form, some of the software applications I developed over the years. The website, then, must be seen as an extension to the book: any idea, claim, or explanation that must be clarified or enhanced will be discussed there.

# Totalitarian Democracy

## The Totalitarian Elites

Our modernity and our mechanistic culture have engendered a new and dangerous phenomenon: educational and business institutions that have more power than our *political* institutions. This phenomenon is dangerous because, while engaged in teaching, or research, or marketing, these institutions are promoting totalitarianism. Thus, although politically our society is still democratic, in effect it is becoming totalitarian.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The expression “totalitarian democracy” (the present section’s title) is explained in the next subsection, “Talmon’s Model of Totalitarianism.”

The totalitarianism promoted through education and through business is due to the mechanistic ideology. Mechanism has been so successful in the exact sciences, and in fields like engineering, that we are ready to accept it in any endeavour. As a result, these institutions have attained, undeservedly, an elitist position. For, we judge their importance, not by the *validity* of their ideas, but by the formality and precision with which they pursue these ideas; in other words, by the mechanistic nature, rather than the usefulness, of their activities.

Universities and corporations like the mechanistic ideology, therefore, because it affords them a privileged position in society regardless of whether their activities are useful or not. Our problems are becoming more and more complex – that is, less and less mechanistic; and yet, these institutions restrict themselves to mechanistic concepts. The reputation of mechanism was established long ago, when our problems were simpler, and mechanistic concepts were generally useful. Today, the mechanistic failures exceed the successes, but we continue to trust the mechanists just as we did in the past.

The reason we continue to embrace mechanism despite its failures is the propaganda conducted by universities and corporations. Since a widespread acceptance of mechanism is the only way to maintain their privileged position, these institutions are aggressively promoting it, while discrediting all other forms of thought. Thus, whereas in the past they were *practising* mechanism, today they are *enforcing* it. Clearly, the propaganda is necessary because mechanism is becoming less and less useful. Were mechanism indeed as beneficial as it is said to be, the mechanists would gain our respect simply by providing answers to our problems. As we saw in the previous chapters, however, mechanistic methods and theories are, in most fields, mere delusions.



Mechanism becomes totalitarian when its status changes from *method* to *myth*. Once it becomes a system of belief, its principles are accepted unquestioningly, and those who were already practising it become revered elites. At that point, mechanism is officially taught and promoted, and every member of society is expected to adopt it.

Thus, if previously the harm was limited to the exploitation of society by the mechanists, now society itself is becoming mechanistic. If previously only the mechanists were wasting their time by pursuing useless activities, now everyone does it. In every field and occupation, people are increasingly judged, not by the value of their work, but by how faithfully they adhere to the mechanistic ideology. Through systematic indoctrination, every person is turned into a bureaucrat – a worker whose task is, simply, to obey the mechanistic principles.

The academic elites carry out the mechanistic indoctrination through the process known as education. The academics, we saw, restrict themselves to mechanistic ideas, because this permits them to stress the *methods*, rather than the *results*, of their research programs. Worthless activities can then be made to look important. And they extend this attitude to education: what they teach is only mechanistic concepts, only what can be described with neat theories and methods. Whether these theories and methods are effective or not is unimportant. Disciplines whose phenomena are almost entirely non-mechanistic – psychology, sociology, linguistics, economics, programming – are taught like the exact sciences. And the notions of expertise, talent, and professional responsibility in these fields are being degraded accordingly: what practitioners are expected to know is, not the utmost that human minds can attain, but only how to apply certain methods.

The business elites, for their part, carry out the mechanistic indoctrination through the process known as marketing. Like the universities, corporations restrict themselves to mechanistic ideas, because this permits them to engage in activities that are predictable and profitable. For example, they prefer products that can be made largely by machines, and workers whose skills are very low or very narrow, in order to control the process of production “scientifically.” Most goods and services, therefore, are restricted to whatever can be done efficiently, through exact methods; so they reflect the limitations of business rather than our real needs. This is why we must be *persuaded* to depend on these goods and services. The persuasion – what we call advertising – consists mainly in exploiting human weaknesses through deceptive messages. The deception is required, obviously, in order to make the limited options possible through mechanistic concepts appear more important than they actually are. The ultimate goal of this indoctrination, then, is to force us all to replace our genuine values with artificial, mechanistic ones.

So mechanism can be just as utopian, and just as totalitarian, as a *political* ideology. As in the case of a political system, if accepted as unquestionable truth – as myth – the entire society will modify itself to fit its dogmas. In fact, it is even easier to be mesmerized by mechanistic ideas than it is by political ones, because we are less likely to suspect their advocates of dishonesty. Mechanism, after all, is not promoted by political parties, but by such respected institutions as universities and corporations. And its dogmas are justified by invoking such notions as science, efficiency, and progress.

A society where various elites are free to promote their ideologies is intrinsically totalitarian, if these ideologies seek to control the values held by large numbers of people. Whether an ideology concerns politics, or religion, or business, or technology, the result is always a spreading bureaucracy: more and more people cease to live a normal life, and follow instead the ideology’s

precepts. But totalitarian ideologies are pseudoscientific, so their utopian promises cannot be fulfilled. The harm they cause, therefore, extends beyond the inevitable disillusionment. For, if too many people accept the promises and cease performing useful activities, the entire society may collapse. Thus, totalitarianism destroys individual lives by tempting people to pursue worthless ideas, and destroys societies by corrupting their human resources.

By describing the promotion of an ideology with terms like “education” and “marketing,” instead of “indoctrination” and “propaganda,” we can continue to call our system democratic even while making it increasingly totalitarian. Again, it is not so much the *promotion* of ideologies that is harmful, as the fact that they are pseudoscientific, and hence bound to fail. Were these ideologies useful, they could be promoted through logic – as are, for instance, our truly scientific theories – and there would be no need for lies and delusions. (We studied in previous chapters the methods employed by charlatans to defend useless concepts, theories, and products; and we saw that most promotions today rely, in fact, on these methods. So the conclusion must be that most concepts, theories, and products promoted today are not as useful as they are said to be.)

A society that tolerates the advancement of *any* ideas through deception is, in effect, out of control. For, as these ideas are worthless, such a society is actually expending its energies on projects that constitute its own destruction.



The reason we fail to notice the totalitarian nature of our present-day culture is that our brand of totalitarianism is being enforced, not by one, but by many different elites. Thus, when we are indoctrinated by the academic elite to embrace mechanism, or by the fashion elite to wear certain clothes, or by the tobacco elite to smoke cigarettes, or by the soft-drink elite to consume beverages, or by the fitness elite to manipulate certain contraptions, or by the automotive elite to prefer certain types of vehicles, or by the entertainment elite to enjoy certain types of TV shows, or by the cosmetics elite to use various concoctions, or by the financial elite to trust certain investments, or by the technology elite to depend on devices, we may be dealing with different organizations, but their ideologies share a common goal: to control our minds. They prevent us from developing useful knowledge, and encourage us to accept instead senseless ideas.

So, just like a *political* totalitarian elite, our elites have the right to shape the lives of millions of people. Also like a political elite, they do this by distorting knowledge, in order to make reality fit their ideology. But if we call this process advertising, or marketing, or public relations, we can delude ourselves that our

culture is different from a *politically* totalitarian one. In reality, totalitarianism based on a non-political ideology is just as harmful.

In addition to their diversity, it is the *weakness* of these elites that prevents us from noticing their totalitarian attitude. In the past, none of these organizations had the power to impose its particular ideology on more than a fraction of the population. And as a result, no one person was influenced by more than a few of them at a given time. Thus, although each elite believes that the whole world ought to accept its ideas, and is attempting to turn us all into the kind of bureaucrats needed to implement these ideas, none has had, so far, the power to carry out its plan. What we have had so far, therefore, is only mild, fragmentary totalitarianism.

Software, however, has changed this. Through software, it has finally become possible for a non-political elite, upholding a non-political ideology, to dominate the entire society. It is the *nature* of software that makes this possible. We mistakenly perceive software as a new kind of product, and hence the software elite as a risk no greater than the traditional elites. In reality, software is a new phenomenon, a new way for human beings to represent the world and to communicate with it. And consequently, the totalitarianism of a software ideology is far more virulent than the traditional ones. If software is like language (as we saw in chapter 4), an elite that controls software controls in effect the means to represent the world; so it controls the way we acquire knowledge, communicate, and conduct our affairs. Ultimately, the elite can control the way we think. For, by distorting our knowledge of software, it can distort our knowledge of everything else. Thus, while the traditional elites could affect only separate aspects of our life, a software elite can affect our entire existence. Through software, therefore, an elite can achieve complete totalitarianism.

As we saw earlier, what is needed to implement totalitarianism is a myth, an elite, and an expanding bureaucracy (see pp. 30–31). With this principle, we can explain why the other elites failed to achieve complete totalitarianism: because, through the traditional mechanistic myth, their bureaucracies could not expand beyond a certain point. And we can also explain why the software elite *can* achieve complete totalitarianism: because, through the mechanistic *software* myth, a bureaucracy can expand easily; it can expand, in principle, to include every member of society.

If the software variant of totalitarianism is as harmful as the political one, we must treat it the same way: we must be as worried about the theories promoted by the software elite, or the spread of a software bureaucracy, or the degradation of minds caused by software devices, as we would if these phenomena were part of a *political* movement. In previous chapters we studied the pseudoscientific nature of the mechanistic software theories, and the

dishonesty of their promoters. Thus, if software mechanism is worthless, as we saw, we already have good reasons for fighting this ideology and the charlatanism it engenders. But full-fledged software totalitarianism will cause much greater harm. The incompetence and corruption found today in the world of programming is but a small problem compared with the widespread destruction of knowledge that we will suffer when our immersion in software mechanism is complete.

To combat software totalitarianism we must first understand it. However, this being a new phenomenon, we only have the studies of *political* totalitarianism as guide. Still, if the main characteristics of totalitarianism are the same in both variants, we should be able to identify in the political studies various aspects that parallel the trends we are witnessing in our software-related affairs. And this, in turn, will help us to appreciate the threat posed by the mechanistic software ideology; that is, to appreciate why the argument against software mechanism is more than just an argument against mistaken programming concepts.

What most political studies do is merely analyze various totalitarian societies and ideologies. To understand those aspects shared by the political and the software variants, however, what we need is an analysis of the fundamental, philosophical aspects of totalitarianism. This is why I have selected two particular studies. One is Talmon's model: a society that is founded on democratic values but is pursuing, in fact, a totalitarian dream – a dream stemming from mechanistic beliefs. The other is Orwell's model: a society where the elite is reducing language to its mechanistic aspects in order to degrade people's minds. We already know that our culture is mechanistic. Thus, since this culture permits us to pursue a totalitarian software ideology while living in a democracy, and since the role of software in society is similar to that of language, these two studies are especially relevant.

## Talmon's Model of Totalitarianism

### 1

In his classic work, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, J. L. Talmon argues that modern totalitarianism derives from *democratic* ideas; specifically, from the ideas prevailing in the eighteenth century, and which led eventually to the French Revolution.<sup>1</sup> The French thinkers of that period were seeking an answer

<sup>1</sup> J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1960). Talmon continued this study in two later books, which discuss the evolution of the totalitarian ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

to the age-old problem of human freedom: what kind of society can guarantee liberty, equality, and happiness for all its citizens? They were convinced that the oppression and misery pervading the world were due simply to ignorance, to man's failure to understand his own nature. If people agreed to explore this issue with an open mind, rather than allow one authority or another to influence them, they would be able to establish a perfect social system. That system would be democratic, and would constitute the best society that human beings can create.

While all thinkers shared this ideal, they differed in the method they recommended for achieving it. There were two schools: The first – which Talmon calls the *liberal* type of democracy – held that, left alone, people will one day discover, simply through trial and error, what is the best way to run a society. The second – which Talmon calls the *totalitarian* type of democracy – held that ordinary people are irrational and undisciplined, so they will never accomplish this on their own. The only practical solution is to endow a wise elite (the leaders, the rulers, the state) with absolute power, and allow it to control all human affairs. With this power, the elite could follow an exact plan, based on objective theories, and force every citizen to conform to it. The guarantee for a perfect society, it was believed, lies in this combination of scientific principles and complete conformism. The elite, of course, would never abuse its power. Since by definition a wise elite identifies itself with the people, it would only use its power benevolently.

The first opportunity a society had to put these ideas to the test was during the French Revolution. And, surprisingly perhaps, it was the *totalitarian* alternative that was chosen. Thus, because the revolution's leaders preferred a democracy based on scientific principles to one based on spontaneous decisions, the movement that started with the promise of universal liberty ended in a violent, totalitarian system. The advocates of scientific social planning learned nothing from this failure, however, and continued to promote their type of democracy ever since. In the twentieth century, the best-known implementation of totalitarian democracy was Communism, while Nazism was an extreme, especially brutal manifestation of the same idea. In the end, liberal democracy – which is what we understand today as “democracy” – proved to be a better alternative, and was adopted by one society after another. The struggle between the totalitarian and the liberal types of democracy, says Talmon, has shaped the history of civilization since the eighteenth century.



The purpose of this discussion is to show that today's academic and business elites hold ideologies that are very similar to the political ideology of

*totalitarian* democracy. And this is no accident: like the traditional elites, our elites claim that their ideologies are scientific (because based on mechanistic principles) and democratic (because beneficial to the majority of people); at the same time, they ask us to renounce all individual freedom (because only through conformism can a scientific and democratic ideology succeed). Stemming as they do from the same mechanistic delusions, these ideologies suffer from the same self-contradictions. Thus, if we want to understand today's totalitarian tendencies, particularly in our software-related affairs, a brief analysis of the original totalitarian theories will be helpful.

The eighteenth-century thinkers believed in the existence of an ideal, natural order. Impressed by the scientific advances of those days, they assumed that similar advances were imminent in social and political matters. Now, the discoveries in physics, chemistry, and astronomy had revealed a simple and logical pattern in the laws of nature. Thus, those thinkers concluded, a similar pattern must exist in the natural *social* laws. Human beings and human societies evolved as part of nature, and, given the beauty and logic of the natural laws already discovered, it is inconceivable that the natural *social* laws would prescribe oppression or unhappiness. The current societies suffer from these evils, therefore, only because we have not yet discovered the natural social laws. Once we discover them, our social relations will be as logical and successful as are our exact sciences.

Those thinkers also believed that all human beings are basically alike. The great differences we note in personality, intelligence, or wealth are due to accident; or they are artificially fostered by certain institutions, which have vested interest in maintaining these differences. Nature could not possibly have intended that such great disparity emerge between creatures which are practically identical when born.

In conclusion, since there undoubtedly exist some logical, natural laws for running a society, and since all human beings are naturally alike, the only explanation for the current misery is that our societies do not reflect the natural order. Specifically, we permit variation and inequality to arise among individual citizens. Hence, once we correct this mistake – once we reduce human existence to those aspects common to all people – the only social principles required will be those based on natural laws. By definition, the resulting system will constitute a perfect society: “If there is such a being as Man in himself, and if we all, when we throw off our accidental characteristics, partake of the same substance, then a universal system of morality, based on the fewest and simplest principles, becomes not only a distinct possibility, but a certainty. Such a system would be comparable in its precision to geometry.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 29–30.

These ideas were expressed most forcefully by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who also explained how to implement them: by divesting people of their personal qualities and endowing them instead with the common, natural ones – what he called the general will. Achieving this transformation is the task of a sovereign (in practice, the ruling elite). Although immanent in each individual, the natural qualities are masked by his current, selfish character, and must be brought out through special education. The individual, in fact, may be so corrupt that he would not appreciate the importance of the transformation, in which case the sovereign must *enforce* it. The revolution will succeed only when all citizens adopt without reservation the general will.

Thus, while the other thinkers saw the idea of a natural social order as little more than a theory, Rousseau presented it as a plan for immediate action. Through the absurd notion of a general will – said to be natural to people but at the same time requiring a powerful elite to enforce it – Rousseau gave rise to modern totalitarianism: a political system that is totalitarian even though grounded on democratic principles.<sup>3</sup>

So it is the idea of natural, innate qualities that is used to justify totalitarianism. The elite claims that, since its ideology reflects some natural, and hence superior, human qualities, forcing an individual to conform to it is not an act of coercion but a sort of teaching. In an ideal world, that individual would display those qualities on his own. It is the fact that he lives in a corrupt society that distorts his character and prevents him from attaining his higher, natural self. In effect, society has denatured him. All that the elite does, then, is restore him to what nature had intended him to be. Thus, we do not object when a teacher forces his pupils to learn rules of grammar or arithmetic, and punishes them if they forget those rules. We do not object because the rules reflect valid, natural laws. Similarly, forcing people to conform to a natural ideology is a form of education: instead of grammar or arithmetic, what we must assimilate now is some *social* rules – rules which reflect the natural human condition, and which will therefore help us to create a perfect society.



We can recognize in these ideas the circularity characteristic of mechanistic delusions. Totalitarian elites see themselves as social engineers, as experts who know how to design societies. Their ideas are a breakthrough in political thought, they say, and what they need now in order to create a perfect society is the authority to implement these ideas. What they need, in other words, is the power to control the lives of millions of people. And they invoke the

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 40–43.

mechanistic philosophy as justification: first, they *invent* some mechanistic theories that match their ideas; then, they offer these theories as *proof* of the validity of their ideas. Since mechanism is universally equated with science, few notice the circularity of this line of logic.

The first theory the elites invent to defend their ideas is that societies are deterministic systems. So, they say, we should be able to design a society by following rigorous methods, just as we do in engineering projects. The elites need such a theory because they intend to replace the current social order with a new one; and only if societies can indeed be created from plans, like buildings, can such a project succeed. In reality, there is no evidence that societies can be designed as we design buildings. The millions of individuals who make up a society are sufficiently different from one another to cause complex, unpredictable social phenomena. It is precisely this diversity that makes the notion of a perfect society a fantasy.

Since it is the differences between individuals that would prevent the elites from implementing their ideas, they are compelled to invent a second theory. They say that human beings are naturally identical and virtuous, and the differences between them are simply deviations from this ideal, due to the corrupt society they live in. And this theory too is mechanistic: it claims, in effect, that human beings are born as a sort of automatons, all driven by the same program. Also like the first theory, there is no evidence that this is true. The elites *wish* this to be true; for, only if human beings are indeed automatons can the plan for erasing the differences between them succeed. The plan calls, in effect, for deleting the diverse, wrong programs running now in millions of individual minds, and installing in all of them an identical, correct program.

So the totalitarian philosophy is not the serious political thesis it is claimed to be, but a mechanistic delusion. What the elites really want is the power to control society; and they rationalize this megalomania by making their arguments look like scientific theories. They invent a theory about individuals in order to support a theory about societies. Both are fantasies, but together they seem to express self-evident truths. What the elites do, in reality, is invoke one mechanistic hypothesis as support for another. Ultimately, they use the mechanistic philosophy to defend the mechanistic philosophy. Being circular, their arguments are fallacious; they do *not* prove that totalitarianism can help us to create a perfect society. The circularity can be detected, in fact, in the very definition of the general will: "There is such a thing as an objective general will, whether willed or not willed by anybody. To become a reality it must be willed by the people. If the people does not will it, it must be made to will it, for the general will is latent in the people's will."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

Talmon calls this delusion the paradox of freedom: the elites promise us freedom, but at the same time they tell us that the only way to have freedom is by giving up individuality, and by conforming to the great whole that is society. Conformism, though, is the opposite of freedom. So, to resolve the contradiction, the elites *redefine* the notion of freedom as *conforming to an ideal*: “On the one hand, the individual is said to obey nothing but his own will; on the other, he is urged to conform to some objective criterion. The contradiction is resolved by the claim that this external criterion is his better, higher, or real self. . . . Hence, even if constrained to obey the external standard, man cannot complain of being coerced, for in fact he is merely being made to obey his own true self. He is thus still free; indeed freer than before.”<sup>5</sup>

The most striking feature of totalitarianism, then, is this insistence on shaping the character of millions of individuals to fit a common mould, while claiming that they continue to be free: “From the difficulty of reconciling freedom with the idea of an absolute purpose spring all the particular problems and antinomies of totalitarian democracy. This difficulty could only be resolved by thinking not in terms of men as they are, but as they were meant to be, and would be, given the proper conditions. In so far as they are at variance with the absolute ideal they can be ignored, coerced or intimidated into conforming, without any real violation of the democratic principle being involved.”<sup>6</sup>



Absurd as they are, these question-begging arguments have been adduced to justify totalitarianism for more than two hundred years. From science-fiction authors to progressive sociologists, from paranoid dictators to learned philosophers, every apologist has defended his particular brand of totalitarianism through the same mechanistic delusions. Thus, since mechanism dominates our present-day culture no less than it did previous ones, we shouldn't be surprised that our own elites, in universities and in business, invoke it to justify *today's* brands of totalitarianism. In the end, all elites say the same thing: the only way to improve matters is through complete conformism; specifically, by implementing a mechanistic ideology and forcing everyone to adhere to it.

What the elites want, in reality, is power – the power that comes from controlling knowledge and minds. And they attain this power by promising to solve our non-mechanistic problems with simple, mechanistic methods. All *we* have to do, they tell us, is obey the ideology; that is, restrict ourselves to

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 2–3.

mechanistic concepts. Non-mechanistic problems, however, cannot have mechanistic solutions, so the promise is a fraud. But because it is so appealing, we believe it. And this is how, at any given time, one or more elites are exploiting us.

Thanks to their similarity, then, totalitarian ideologies are easy to recognize: An elite promotes certain ideas about people and societies – ideas that are precise and attractive, but very different from the way people normally live. For these ideas to succeed, therefore, everyone must change so as to conform to them. And if some of us resist the change, this can only mean that we are too ignorant to appreciate the promised benefits. After all, being mechanistic, the ideas themselves cannot possibly be wrong. So we must be *forced* to change. This is not coercion, though, but education: we are forced, in effect, to think and live correctly. Whether the ideas concern politics, or work, or personal life, with proper teaching anyone can learn to appreciate them. (See also the related discussion in the introductory chapter, pp. 17–18.)

## 2

Let us see now how Talmon's totalitarian model is reflected in today's ideologies. Starting with the academic elites, the idea promoted is that phenomena involving minds and societies can be represented mechanistically, just like physical phenomena. In other words, we should be able to explain all human phenomena from a knowledge of the basic human propensities, just as we explain the operation of a machine from a knowledge of its basic components. It is possible to discover exact theories of mind and society. One day, we will be as successful in fields like psychology, sociology, and linguistics as we are in physics and astronomy.

These theories, however, do not work. And they do not work because human beings and human societies are *not* the deterministic systems the mechanists assume them to be. In chapter 3 we saw that these theories are, in fact, pseudoscientific: when falsified by evidence, the mechanists resort to various stratagems in order to cover up the falsifications. So, if three hundred years of mechanistic philosophy have failed to produce a single working theory in the human sciences, and if it is so easy to show that the promoters of these theories are not scientists but charlatans, common sense alone ought to prompt us to question the academics' elitist position. The fact that we do not question it demonstrates how successful is the mechanistic propaganda conducted by the universities.

Academic mechanism, thus, is a totalitarian ideology – because it asks us to change so as to conform to its tenets. It does not earn its status through real

achievements, but through coercion: we are *forced* to accept it, regardless of whether the theories work or not. We are intimidated by its successes in the exact sciences, and we allow charlatans to fool us into accepting it in every other field. Both education and research are now little more than mechanistic indoctrination: every aspect of reality is described in mechanistic terms, and we must restrict ourselves to mechanistic practices. As a result of this indoctrination, we treat mechanism as unquestionable truth, as the only valid form of thought. And we respect anyone who upholds a mechanistic idea, even if the idea is worthless.

So the change demanded by the mechanistic ideology consists in replacing our traditional perception of knowledge, science, and research with a degraded one: the pursuit of mechanistic ideas. Instead of admiring accomplishments, we admire conformism. What we expect to see in academic work is not expertise and originality, not the utmost that human beings can attain, but merely the faithful application of mechanistic methods. Thus, since anyone with a bureaucratic mind can follow methods, individuals incapable of doing anything useful are perceived as scientists.

And this is not all. The theories promoted by the mechanists are about human beings – that is, about *us*. So, when we accept them, we do more than just agree to treat the academic charlatans as elites. What we really do is accept their claim that we are deterministic systems. By respecting the mechanists and their work, we are saying in effect that we think their project is important, and likely to succeed. But this project is an attempt to prove that human beings are in reality automatons. So our acceptance means that, like the academics themselves, we believe this *is* what we are. Our acceptance shows, therefore, how advanced is our mechanistic indoctrination – our dehumanization. For, we would not respect researchers who try to prove that we are automatons unless we already thought and acted, to some degree, like automatons. The reason we accept their theories, then, is that we no longer see ourselves as free and responsible agents.

In the end, because we trust the mechanists and increasingly restrict ourselves to mechanistic performance, these theories are becoming more and more plausible: they describe human beings and human societies more and more accurately. This is not because the mechanists are right, though, but because *we* are becoming, little by little, the deterministic systems they say we are. Thus, while failing in human affairs as scientific concept, mechanism is successful as totalitarian ideology: we are indeed changing to conform to its tenets.



Let us turn next to the corporate elites. The idea promoted now is that every problem can be solved by purchasing something. In personal or professional pursuits, in our kitchens or in our offices, in matters of health or intellect or finance, the solution to a problem can always be found in a product sold by a company. While the traditional view is that we must study if we want to gain knowledge, practise if we want to develop expertise, change our lifestyle if we want to be fit, do something useful if we want to get rich, and alter our world view if we want to be happy, modern companies can help us avoid these challenges: we can achieve the same results, immediately and effortlessly, simply by purchasing their latest products.<sup>7</sup>

These products, however, do not work – at least, not in the way we are promised. And they do not work because difficult challenges cannot be met simply by purchasing something. Ready-made products are limited, by their very nature, to mechanistic concepts: they embody specific combinations of features and capabilities, on the assumption that every problem can be reduced to such combinations. Our most important problems, though, are non-mechanistic, because they reflect the complex phenomena that make up our existence. They can only be solved, therefore, through our own knowledge, experience, and effort. Products alone cannot help us, because no set of products can embody enough combinations of details to satisfy our combinations of needs. We are impressed by their ability to solve isolated, mechanistic problems, and we are fooled by the claim that they can also solve the important, complex ones. So, although products usually *function* as promised, this doesn't mean that they can also improve our life as promised.

If a product is actually not as useful as we think it is, the only way for its maker to make us buy it is by deceiving us. The process whereby a useless thing is made to appear useful is known as advertising. And, since more and more products need to be sold in this manner, advertising has become the most important part of trade. To put it differently, if advertising were restricted to factual information about a product's features (similarly, for instance, to the arguments accepted in a court of law), perhaps only 10 percent of what is being bought today would continue to be bought: those products that are indeed as useful as we think they are. It is not too much to say, then, that our economy is almost entirely dependent on the permission that companies have to tell lies and to exploit people's ignorance.

This contrasts sharply with the situation, say, one hundred years ago, when most products were useful and very few had to be sold through deception. In the past, the promotion of a product needed only plain statements, and perhaps

<sup>7</sup> To extend the range of this ideology, many services (bank accounts, insurance plans, investment schemes) are now called products.

some flourishes and exaggerations. Today, on the other hand, promotion means a systematic generation of delusions. Thus, advertising techniques that are now universal were employed in the past only by charlatans. Some examples: presenting particular instances (testimonials, success stories, case studies) as evidence of the product's usefulness, which is logically equivalent to lying (see p. 220); describing the product with deliberately misleading sentences – sentences that appear to state important facts while saying in reality nothing meaningful or accountable (see “The Practice of Deceit” in chapter 5); arbitrarily displaying attractive, smiling faces, which compels us to associate the product with beauty, youth, health, and happiness; deceptive prices, like \$19.99; adding background music and special effects on radio and television – in order to distract and confuse us, and to induce a favourable mood.

The reason for the incessant lies is the declining usefulness of mechanism. In the past, when our problems were simpler, ready-made products were quite effective, so there was no need for deception. But our world is becoming more and more complex, and complex problems cannot be solved mechanistically – that is, by separating them into simpler ones. Advertising, thus, serves as mechanistic indoctrination: the corporate elites must persuade us that their products, which are based on mechanistic concepts, can solve our complex problems.

Like academic mechanism, then, business mechanism is a totalitarian ideology – because it asks us to change so as to conform to its tenets. When we succumb to advertising, we do more than just agree to be exploited by charlatans: we agree to forgo our non-mechanistic capabilities, and to restrict ourselves to mechanistic performance. While the world consists of complex phenomena, we see only its mechanistic aspects. Ultimately, the change demanded of us is to simplify our lives to the point where all our needs can be satisfied by purchasing ready-made products, and to limit our knowledge so as to remain dependent, in everything we do, on these products.

The elites, for their part, tell us that the mechanistic concepts only *appear* to be restrictive: we fail to appreciate their value because of our current, inefficient habits. Mechanism means science, we are told, so it is silly to think that our minds can be better than products based on mechanistic concepts. What we interpret as creativity and originality – what these products are eliminating – is in reality an old-fashioned, undisciplined way of doing things. Thus, just as education often forces children to accept notions they don't understand, for their own good, *we* must be forced to depend on ready-made products, for our own good. In the end, the restriction to mechanistic concepts is no more coercive than any type of education. What we are taught now is how to live efficiently; in particular, how to replace the dependence on personal knowledge and skills with a dependence on modern products.

Also like academic mechanism, business mechanism is successful as totalitarian ideology; that is, we *are* becoming the automatons the elites say we are. For, if we are forced to spend more and more time with useless mechanistic solutions, we are bound to spend less and less time developing our non-mechanistic capabilities. As we get to depend on ready-made products in every activity, the only knowledge we acquire is the trivial, mechanistic type needed to use these products. So we are being reduced, little by little, to the level of machines. But the result of this transformation is that the claims made for ready-made products are becoming increasingly accurate: since we no longer care about complex phenomena, it no longer matters that our complex problems remain unsolved; since we are dealing only with the mechanistic problems, the products increasingly appear to be as useful as their promoters say they are.

## Orwell's Model of Totalitarianism

### 1

George Orwell's conception of totalitarianism is best known from his last work, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which was published in 1949. But to appreciate his remarkable insight into the nature of totalitarianism, and his ongoing preoccupation with it, we must study his writings over the preceding ten years. Although in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* he depicts an established totalitarian state, his aim was not to expose the evils of Nazism and Communism (the totalitarian ideologies of the 1940s), but to draw attention to the totalitarian tendencies of the *democratic* cultures.

Because he died shortly after the book's publication, Orwell did not have the opportunity to clarify its links to his actual views and concerns. A letter he wrote at the time, and which was widely published, is probably the only record of these links: "I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily *will* arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it *could* arrive.... The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasize that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, *if not fought against*, could triumph anywhere."<sup>1</sup>

Orwell's model, then, involves not just a certain type of totalitarianism, but

<sup>1</sup> George Orwell, "Letter to Francis A. Henson," in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, vol. 4, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 564.

also the *progression* of a society toward totalitarianism. He noticed that many aspects of the degradation reached in the totalitarian countries could also be found, to some degree, in the democratic ones. And this degradation was growing and spreading. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell drew an exaggerated, unrealistic picture of totalitarianism, in order to stress its dehumanizing effects. But, he warns us, while *that* totalitarianism is indeed a fantasy, its milder counterpart in our own society is real. It would be instructive, therefore, to review some of the totalitarian aspects of our culture, and to see how they have evolved since Orwell's time. This will help us to recognize the totalitarian aspects of our software practices, which, of course, he could not have anticipated.



One thing Orwell noticed was the ease with which people could be persuaded to accept totalitarian ideas. Totalitarianism, we saw, is presented as a *scientific* doctrine, because it is derived from mechanism. Most people fail to recognize its fallacies, and succumb to its utopian promises. Thus, like all pseudosciences, totalitarianism is appealing because it seems to offer easy solutions to complex problems: people accept it for the same reason they accept astrology, superstitions, and magic systems. But Orwell was especially annoyed to see that the most ardent supporters of totalitarianism are found among *educated* people: "I believe ... that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere."<sup>2</sup> "What is sinister ... is that the conscious enemies of liberty are those to whom liberty ought to mean most.... The direct, conscious attack on intellectual decency comes from the intellectuals themselves."<sup>3</sup>

Recall the mechanistic pseudosciences we examined in chapter 3. Instead of trying to understand the true nature of minds and societies, the academics *assume* they are mechanistic phenomena. Theories based on this assumption never work, but the academics refuse to admit that they are wrong, that human phenomena are in fact non-mechanistic. Thus, the academics are not serious scientists. They have redefined their responsibility, from the difficult challenge of discovering useful theories, to the easier challenge of practising mechanism. And, since mechanistic ideas in human affairs are intrinsically totalitarian, the tendency among intellectuals to accept totalitarian ideas implicitly – what Orwell condemned – is a consequence of their tendency to accept *mechanistic* ideas implicitly. Orwell noticed this corruption even in the 1940s, and was right to warn us about its growth. For, this is indeed what has happened: while

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," in *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 93.

mechanistic theories were already a temptation in the human sciences, they have become, since then, the only type of theories officially accepted.

In the end, “a society becomes totalitarian when its structure becomes flagrantly artificial: that is, when its ruling class has lost its function but succeeds in clinging to power by force or fraud.”<sup>4</sup> If we take the academic elite to be one of our ruling classes, this observation describes perfectly its degradation since Orwell’s time. The mechanists have turned disciplines like linguistics, economics, and programming into pseudosciences. What they perceive as research is in reality a never-ending series of attempts to cover up the failure of mechanistic theories. Thus, they are deceiving society in order to maintain their elitist position. As Orwell said, they are clinging to power through fraud, and in so doing they are fostering totalitarianism.



Another thing Orwell noticed and warned about was the trend toward a centralized economy, or collectivism. While enthusiastically advocated by experts as a progressive and effective system, a state-directed economy is, in reality, the exact opposite: it corrupts both the economy and politics, and undermines liberal values by promoting conformism. Thus, Orwell was one of the few to recognize the link between a government-controlled economy and totalitarianism. Writing in 1941, he makes this observation: “When one mentions totalitarianism one thinks immediately of Germany, Russia, Italy, but I think one must face the risk that this phenomenon is going to be world-wide. It is obvious that the period of free capitalism is coming to an end and that one country after another is adopting a centralized economy that one can call Socialism or state capitalism according as one prefers.”<sup>5</sup> A socialist himself, Orwell had by then realized that socialism is largely a theoretical concept, that in practice it leads to totalitarianism.

In practice, therefore, the *economic* philosophy of central planning cannot be distinguished from the *political* philosophy of totalitarianism. And it is hardly necessary to point out that the intervention of governments in their country’s economy has been increasing steadily since Orwell’s time, as he said it would. In the last twenty years, particularly, fantastic monetary and fiscal policies – politically motivated – have given rise to the kind of central control that feeds on itself. We have reached the point where many countries can no longer function as liberal, free economies, and depend for survival on a perpetual increase in central control and a continuation of the same

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>5</sup> George Orwell, “Literature and Totalitarianism,” in *Collected Essays*, vol. 2, p. 162.

fantastic policies. Under these conditions, the drift toward totalitarianism is not surprising.

With our model of simple and complex structures it is not difficult to understand the delusions of central economic planning. A country's economy is a complex phenomenon. It is the result of an infinity of interactions between millions of individuals, who act in various capacities: consumers, producers, workers, managers, inventors, entrepreneurs, financiers, and so forth. Thus, by encouraging uninhibited interactions, a free economy is the most likely to reflect, in the long run, the true needs and capabilities of the people. Governments like the idea of central planning because they believe it to be an improvement over a disorganized, free economy: why wait for the results of some random interactions, when we have experts who can control this phenomenon scientifically, and thereby guarantee a stable, ideal economy?

To control the economy, though, the experts must understand it. And, as we know, a complex phenomenon cannot be understood as we understand the working of a machine; that is, precisely enough to predict its manifestations and to control it. The experts, therefore, are compelled to invent theories based on a simplified, mechanistic version of the economy. They ignore the infinity of low-level interactions that make it up, and study separately its high-level aspects: inflation, unemployment, growth, government debt, stock market, gross domestic product, and so forth. In other words, they attempt to depict a complex structure as a combination of several simple ones. At this point, it seems logical to represent those separated aspects with exact values (averages, percentages, formulas, charts), and, moreover, to attempt to control the economy by manipulating these values. They forget that what they are studying is no longer the real economy, but a simpler, imaginary version. They may even manage to improve one aspect or another. But because they ignored the interactions between them, this is accomplished at the expense of other aspects, which deteriorate.

So the mechanistic economic theories are pseudoscientific. In the end, because they are concerned with minds and societies, they suffer from the same fallacies as the theories we examined in chapter 3. All these theories fail for the same reason: their assumption that human beings and human societies are deterministic systems.

Our model also explains why the idea of central economic planning is totalitarian. Its most appealing element is the promise of financial security for every citizen: the state will take care of our basic needs, leaving us free to pursue our careers and lifestyles. This promise, however, is an illusion. To implement a centrally-controlled economy, the state must assume that the needs of millions of individuals can be analyzed and controlled. It must assume, in other words, that human beings are a sort of automatons, driven by

known programs. So, because it is based on invalid premises, because our needs are in reality complex and diverse, this economy is bound to fail. The only way to make it work is by *enforcing* it; namely, by asking us to replace our actual needs with the kind of needs that make central planning possible. Through education and through propaganda, we are told what knowledge is correct, what facts are important, what career is appropriate, what things must be purchased, what conduct is desirable, what to expect in the future, and so on. In the end, our needs will be simple, uniform, and predictable – the needs of automatons. To put this differently, since mechanistic economic theories do not reflect human nature, to make them work we must modify the people to match the theories: we must turn them into deterministic systems.

We can have government-controlled financial security, then, only if we agree to obey certain standards. In exchange for security, we replace individuality with conformism. Thus, there is only one step from accepting central economic planning to accepting totalitarianism. And, again, Orwell saw this trend clearly: “With [centralized economy] the economic liberty of the individual, and to a great extent his liberty to do what he likes, to choose his own work, to move to and fro across the surface of the earth, comes to an end. Now, till recently the implications of this were not foreseen. It was never fully realized that the disappearance of economic liberty would have any effect on intellectual liberty. Socialism was usually thought of as a sort of moralized liberalism. The state would take charge of your economic life and set you free from the fear of poverty, unemployment and so forth, but it would have no need to interfere with your private intellectual life.... Now, on the existing evidence, one must admit that these ideas have been falsified. Totalitarianism has abolished freedom of thought to an extent unheard of in any previous age.”<sup>6</sup>

## 2

The best-known aspect of Orwell’s totalitarian model is the use of language to control minds. (Orwell is generally recognized as the first thinker to study seriously this phenomenon.) It is from his discussion in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* that most people are familiar with Orwell’s ideas (see “Orwell’s Newspeak” in chapter 5). Just as it exaggerates the other aspects of totalitarianism, though,

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. Note how Orwell is referring to socialism and to totalitarianism interchangeably. The most outspoken critic of central economic planning was probably philosopher and economist F. A. Hayek. For fifty years, in numerous studies, Hayek exposed the fallacies and the totalitarian tendencies of this idea. His best-known book on this subject is *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, 50th anniversary ed.). It is worth noting that Orwell actually read this book and praised it in a brief review.

that book exaggerates the language abuses, in order to demonstrate the *potential* of language manipulation. Orwell's intent was not so much to attack the totalitarian ideology itself, as to warn us that any society can become totalitarian. Thus, when we study his earlier writings, we realize that the hypothetical language abuses depicted in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are a reflection of *real* abuses – those he noticed in the society of his time. So they are not a wild fantasy, but a logical extrapolation of *existing* conditions.

In our analysis we concluded that Orwell's chief contribution has been to make us aware of the link between language, mechanism, and totalitarianism (see pp. 405–407). The three are inseparable. Thus, in a totalitarian society people must act like automatons, and language is an important part of this transformation: by reducing language to its mechanistic aspects, the elite can restrict knowledge and thought to the level of machines. Conversely, a society where various elites are permitted to manipulate language in this fashion will be restricted to mechanistic values, and will become in the end totalitarian. How a society uses language, therefore, is a good indication of its progression toward totalitarianism: the greater the manipulation of language, the more totalitarian the society.

Orwell studied the language employed in speeches, pamphlets, articles, and debates, and saw that it was designed largely to deceive, rather than inform. He also noticed that the deception was achieved by restricting discourse to high levels of abstraction. Instead of simple and precise statements, the propagandists use euphemisms, vague terms, slogans, and standard phrases: “The whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness.”<sup>7</sup> “As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of *words* chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more of *phrases* tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house.”<sup>8</sup>

We recognize this style as mechanistic language. Recall our discussion in chapter 5. Only by starting with *low-level* linguistic elements can a message convey information. When communicating through high-level elements – through prefabricated linguistic parts – the deceivers force us in effect to commit the two mechanistic fallacies, abstraction and reification: they restrict us to a fraction of the alternatives present in the new knowledge, and they prevent us from linking their message to our previous knowledge.

The aim of mechanistic language, then, is to control minds. To discover the meaning of a message, we must combine the meaning of its words and phrases with the knowledge structures already present in the mind. And when this

<sup>7</sup> George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 163.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

process starts at high levels of abstraction, very few combinations are possible. Moreover, if those words and phrases are purposely selected so as to mislead us, we will create only *wrong* combinations, those that do *not* reflect reality.

Charlatans prefer high levels of abstraction, therefore, because of their usefulness as means of deception. An acronym, for example, stands for a whole phrase – a phrase which in its turn stands for many combinations of facts. But by employing the acronym in a certain way, and by tempting us to adopt it in our own discourse, a charlatan can make us associate it with just *a few* combinations: those we already perceive as “good.” So we end up interpreting the acronym itself, and everything involving it, as “good.” Having lost the lower levels – the individual words, their meanings and associations – we can no longer judge how important or unimportant are the facts subsumed by the acronym. Thus, while the high level of abstraction of the acronym seems to function merely as abbreviation, its real purpose is to shape and restrict thought. (See the discussion in chapter 5, pp. 373–374, 395–396, 403–404.)

Like acronyms, any high-level linguistic form – standard phrases, slogans, and the rest – can be used to avoid details and to obscure facts. In the aforementioned essay, Orwell analyzes several instances of political writing, and notes that this style is widespread: “This mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked characteristic of modern English prose, and especially of any kind of political writing.”<sup>9</sup> But, while found earlier mainly in political writing, this style is employed today in nearly every field. In business computing, for instance, an article may be nothing more than some bombastic sentences praising the latest fads, reinforced with fashionable acronyms, and interspersed with slogans like “IT strategic planning,” “empowering the enterprise,” “competitive advantage,” “mission-critical applications,” and “business agility.”

Improper use of high levels of abstraction is a sign of bad English, of course. But those who employ this style do it deliberately. For, their intent is not to debate logically a particular issue, but on the contrary, to force their readers to accept a distorted view of that issue. So this kind of writing betrays not so much a linguistic deficiency as an effort to control minds, which is the essence of totalitarianism. Or, putting this in reverse, only writers with a totalitarian attitude need to employ such a style. Also, the style’s prevalence – the fact that we accept it rather than condemn it – indicates that the entire society is becoming totalitarian. It is this link between language and totalitarianism that preoccupied Orwell: “There does seem to be a direct connexion between acceptance of totalitarian doctrines and the writing of bad English . . .”<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> George Orwell, “Editorial to *Polemic*,” in *Collected Essays*, vol. 4, p. 190.



“To be corrupted by totalitarianism one does not have to live in a totalitarian country.”<sup>11</sup> What Orwell meant is that the totalitarian mentality – elitism, conformism, bureaucratization, mind control – is found everywhere, and can corrupt any society. He was describing mostly its effect on writers and commentators, but this mentality has been spreading, and it affects now every aspect of society.

In the end, non-political totalitarianism can be as harmful as the political kind. If every elite is permitted to promote its ideology, and to deceive and exploit society, their total effect can be significant even if the individual elites are not. This is true because all these ideologies are similar to the totalitarian one: they claim that ideas based on mechanistic principles can solve our complex, non-mechanistic problems. The elites must uphold such ideologies because they can *only* offer us mechanistic solutions. We alone, with our minds, can conceive the non-mechanistic ones; and for this we need no elites. To stay in power, therefore, the elites must incessantly persuade us that their mechanistic concepts are more important than our minds. And this is why, ultimately, all elites deceive and exploit society in the same way.

We can also understand now why all elites end up manipulating language. We use language to represent the world in our minds, and to communicate with it. This is possible because language permits us to create complex knowledge structures. Since the world consists of complex phenomena, we *must* develop complex structures if we want to mirror the world accurately in the mind. By restricting language to its mechanistic aspects, the elites hope to make us see only the *mechanistic* aspects of the world – only the simple, isolated phenomena. And this, in turn, would make us accept their mechanistic ideas.

Each elite misleads us in a few, specific situations; but if all of them do this, it means that we are being misled all the time. Each elite wants to control just one aspect of our life; but between them, they control our entire existence. While each elite is promoting a different idea, they all do it by restricting us to high levels of abstraction, so they all prevent us from developing complex knowledge structures. Their goal, again, is to make their mechanistic ideas appear more important than they actually are. But, even though individually the deceptive messages may be weak, their cumulative effect is pernicious. If we are restricted to mechanistic values in all our affairs – in personal and in professional matters, in education and in business – our non-mechanistic capabilities remain undeveloped. Ultimately, we will indeed see only the mechanistic aspects of the world, just as the elites intended. At that point, those

<sup>11</sup> Orwell, “Prevention of Literature,” p. 90.

useless ideas will finally seem important to us, because we will only be able to judge them with limited, mechanistic knowledge.

Clearly, then, if we live in a society where various elites have the right to control our knowledge and our values, the fact that our *political* system is democratic is irrelevant. If these elites are shaping our minds so as to accept mechanistic ideas that serve their interests, and if between them they have more power than our political institutions, our system is in effect totalitarian. To appreciate this, imagine that we had, not many academic and business elites inducing us to accept mechanistic ideas, but only one, political elite doing it. We would then easily recognize the system as totalitarian. In practice, therefore, there is no real difference between the two alternatives.

## Software Totalitarianism

### 1

Talmon's model, we saw, can explain why academic and business mechanism become totalitarian ideologies. As in the case of political ideologies, the elites ask us to change so as to conform to an exact theory. This combination of science and total conformism, they say, is what will bring about a perfect society.

Let us use Talmon's model to explain why *software* mechanism becomes totalitarian. Software mechanism is, ultimately, the marriage of academic mechanism and business mechanism: the mechanistic software theories are invented in universities, and the software companies invoke these theories to justify the idea of software *products*.

The software theories claim that software applications are nothing but modules within modules, so the most effective way to develop them is by emulating the process of manufacturing. Devices like cars and appliances are designed as hierarchical structures of smaller and smaller subassemblies, ending with parts that are simple enough to be made directly. With this method, the task of manufacturing is reduced to the easier task of *assembling*: no matter how complex the finished product, every stage in its manufacture is now as simple as combining a number of parts into a larger part. Similarly, if we design our software applications as hierarchical structures of modules, programming will be reduced to the easier task of assembling pieces of software: starting with some small parts, we will build larger and larger modules, until we reach the complete application. Working in this fashion, even the most complex applications can be developed with skills no greater than those required to combine pieces of software.

If software can be built as we build cars and appliances – if, in other words, software is merely a new kind of product – the conclusion is that what we need is not expert programmers but a software industry: companies that make software products just as manufacturing companies make the traditional products. By running, as it were, efficient software factories, these companies should be able to supply most applications that society needs. And to help us build on our own those applications that are too specialized to be made as mass-market products, the software companies can give us *development tools*. These sophisticated software devices simplify the development of applications by providing high-level starting elements; namely, relatively large software subassemblies, instead of the small parts used in traditional programming. With these devices, even the least experienced among us should be able to create unique, customized applications.

This mechanistic software dream, however, cannot be fulfilled. As we saw in previous chapters, the theories are wrong when assuming that software applications can be treated as simple hierarchical structures. The facts, processes, and events that make up our affairs give rise to complex phenomena, and hence interacting structures. So, to represent them accurately, our software applications too must consist of interacting structures. If we follow the theories and separate the software structures, our applications will not match reality; for, as simple structures, they cannot display all the alternatives displayed by the complex phenomena. And if, in addition, we start with high-level elements, there will be even fewer alternatives. When forcing us to separate structures and to start from higher levels, the software elites force us in effect to commit the two mechanistic fallacies, reification and abstraction. The reduction in alternatives, then, is not surprising.

Whether we buy ready-made applications or make our own with development tools, applications based on mechanistic concepts can represent only the simple, mechanistic aspects of our affairs. Thus, the claim that these expedients have replaced the need for traditional programming, and for programming expertise, is a fraud. Only by resorting to our non-mechanistic capabilities – that is, through personal skills and experience – can we create applications versatile enough to represent accurately our affairs.

If the ready-made applications and the development tools are not, in fact, as useful as we think they are, the only way to make us depend on them is through deception. And indeed, software products are advertised just like the traditional consumer products: through testimonials, success stories, misleading language, portrayal of happy faces, and so forth. Thus, while addressing mostly businesses, and while discussing such issues as productivity and efficiency, software advertising is merely exploiting human weaknesses and ignorance, just like traditional advertising.

The goal of traditional advertising, we saw, is to persuade us that products based on mechanistic concepts will also solve our *complex* problems. Similarly, the goal of software advertising is to persuade us that applications based on mechanistic software concepts can represent complex phenomena – our business, social, and personal affairs. Also like traditional advertising, if software advertising were restricted to verifiable claims, only a small fraction of the applications and tools being bought today would continue to be bought: those that are indeed as beneficial as we think they are (specifically, those addressing problems that can be usefully approximated through mechanistic methods). For software, however, this fraction is much smaller than it is for the traditional products, probably less than 1 percent.

Like business and academic mechanism, then, software mechanism asks us to change: we must limit ourselves, in all software-related activities, to what can be accomplished with mechanistic concepts alone. In reality, we *can* develop non-mechanistic capabilities – knowledge, skills, experience – so we *can* create non-mechanistic software. But, the elites tell us, these capabilities are unreliable, and it is best to forgo them. Software mechanism, thus, is totalitarian – because it asks us to conform to its tenets. We must replace our natural, non-mechanistic capabilities with mechanistic ones. And we must replace our intuitive definition of software expertise – the utmost that human minds can attain – with a degraded one: the capability to understand mechanistic software concepts.

Now, if software were indeed just a new kind of product, software totalitarianism would mean only that the elites have found one more way to impoverish our existence. The harm, in other words, would be no worse than the harm caused by the traditional forms of academic and business totalitarianism. Software, however, is not just another product. Because of its versatility, software must be treated as a new phenomenon – a phenomenon comparable in potency to the phenomenon of language. Like language, software permits us to represent the world through symbols, and to communicate with it. It is their ability to generate *complex* structures, and hence to represent the world as it actually is, that distinguishes language and software systems from ordinary products. And it is precisely this ability that is lost when they are reduced to mechanistic systems. They behave then just like ordinary products, and they cease to mirror the world accurately.

Software is different from the expedients promoted by the traditional elites, therefore, because of its potential as a means of domination. When restricting us to mechanistic software, the elites restrict us in effect to thinking like automatons. Before, a certain type of product could be used by an elite to restrict only one aspect of our life; and no one was affected by more than a few types of product at a time. But as we get to depend on computers in more and

more activities, the software elites have the opportunity to restrict practically every aspect of our life.

In conclusion, a society can become totalitarian simply by pursuing mechanistic ideas. And we saw that Talmon's model of totalitarianism can explain this phenomenon. There is a clear progression: from mechanistic theories that affect just academic bureaucrats, to products that affect many individuals but in a limited way, to software concepts that affect all members of society, in all their activities. In the past, only political institutions could enforce an ideology on such a large scale, and this is why Talmon's model describes *political* mechanism. But if software is now comparable in its scope to politics – if, that is, software concepts affect society as drastically as do the traditional political concepts – this model should also depict *our* situation.

Politically, a society becomes totalitarian when millions of people are forced to conform to mechanistic social concepts. And if the same people are forced to conform instead to mechanistic *software* concepts, the result is bound to be the same. For, in both cases, the effect is to restrict these people to mechanistic performance in every aspect of their life. Thus, all we have to do in order to use Talmon's model for today's society is substitute software for politics. The model explains then why our widespread adoption of mechanistic software ideas is causing a drift toward totalitarianism.

## 2

Orwell's model, we saw, explains our progression toward totalitarianism by pointing to the steady degradation in social values: the growing politicization of the economy, the growing corruption of the elites, and, especially, the growing use of language to control minds. The elites are promoting mechanistic notions; in addition, they are restricting language to high levels of abstraction, and this prevents us from recognizing how limited the mechanistic notions actually are.

The greatest value of Orwell's model, however, lies in helping us to understand the phenomenon of *software* totalitarianism – a phenomenon that did not even exist in his time. Thus, while warning us about the growth of traditional totalitarianism in the 1940s, Orwell created a model that can be used to explain the growth of software totalitarianism today.

Recall the similarity of language and software. Both function as systems of representation and communication, so both allow us to create complex structures that mirror the world. But, above all, it is our capacity to process these structures together with the *other* knowledge structures present in our minds that permits language and software to represent the world. With language, we

saw, only by starting at low levels of abstraction can a message represent the world accurately. And the same is true of software: only by starting with low-level elements can a software application represent our affairs accurately. With both systems, when starting from high levels we lose the low-level interactions between structures, and hence many combinations of elements. The values we see at the top level are then only a fraction of all possible values. Thus, our knowledge of the world can be impoverished by restricting *software* to high levels of abstraction just as it can be by restricting language.

Orwell criticized the use of high-level linguistic elements – expressing an idea by combining ready-made phrases instead of starting with words. But this style, the essence of language impoverishment, is precisely the style recommended by our software experts for *programming*. All programming theories claim that applications can be designed as modules within modules, just like the appliances built in a factory; so programming can be based on the idea of software subassemblies – ready-made, high-level pieces of software. We have reached, therefore, an absurd situation: what we recognize as harmful in language – the mechanistic mode of communication – we strive to attain in software. Take, for instance, the following remark: “Political writing in our time consists almost entirely of prefabricated phrases bolted together like the pieces of a child’s Meccano set.”<sup>1</sup> Orwell is using here the metaphor of a child’s building blocks to mock the high-level, vacuous linguistic style employed by propagandists. He could not have imagined that a few decades later, in programming, similar metaphors would be *seriously* used by experts to *praise* the high-level style.

Mechanism, we saw, destroys minds by reducing knowledge and thought to the level of machines. And mechanistic language enhances this process, because language structures interact with all other knowledge structures. Restricted to mechanistic thinking, we cannot develop *complex* knowledge. We become, in effect, automatons. We also saw that it is in the interest of the elites to maintain a mechanistic culture, because this guarantees ignorance and dependence: the mechanistic concepts promoted by the elites prevent us from using our minds; we cannot solve our complex problems, and we believe that the only answer is to adopt even more of these concepts; but this only increases our dependence on the elites and on mechanistic concepts, further degrading our minds, in a vicious circle.

And if software fulfils the same social role as language, a dependence on mechanistic software is bound to have the same effect. The software elites

<sup>1</sup> George Orwell, “The Prevention of Literature,” in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, vol. 4, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 89.

promote mechanistic software concepts in order to keep us ignorant and dependent on their devices. But it is not only in software-related matters that we remain ignorant. Because we depend on computers in every aspect of our life, software structures, like language structures, interact with all other knowledge structures present in the mind. So the software elites are controlling our minds through software just as the traditional elites are through the older concepts and through language. The traditional elites, we saw, have more power between them than our political institutions. And, since their ideologies are totalitarian, our society is becoming totalitarian despite its democratic foundation. But the software elites are even more powerful than the traditional ones, so our progression toward totalitarianism is now even faster. They are more powerful because they are permitted to control, not an ordinary concept, but software.

The manipulation of language by the traditional elites forms, in the end, only a small part of our entire use of language. The manipulation of software by the software elites, on the other hand, is almost total. Only in the imaginary society of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is the enforcement of language mechanism comparable to the enforcement of software mechanism in our own society. Thus, while no elite in a real society can ever have enough power to manipulate *language* to such an extent, our software elites already have this power in manipulating *software*. And, if even the relatively mild *language* mechanism currently imposed on us can degrade our minds, and can foster a totalitarian culture, it is safe to predict that complete *software* mechanism will cause widespread ignorance, and will bring about full-fledged totalitarianism.

### 3

Recall Orwell's observation that even a democratic society can be corrupted by totalitarianism (p. 865). Under the guise of administration, or education, or marketing, every elite is distorting knowledge in order to promote its ideas. The process of communication becomes a process of indoctrination: people are seen as little more than automatons that must be programmed to accept whatever ideology serves the interests of the elites.

And now we must add to this the corruption caused by *software* totalitarianism: universities are teaching pseudoscientific software notions, instead of fostering professionalism and responsibility; programmers rely on worthless theories, development tools, and ready-made pieces of software, instead of improving their skills; software systems are routinely promoted through testimonials and success stories – means of deception traditionally employed to promote useless consumer products; important software decisions are being

made following the advice of charlatans acting as consultants, or lecturers, or gurus; workers in all fields are spending more and more of their time with software-related problems, instead of practising their profession; respected computer associations are promoting software notions that serve the interests of the software elite, not society; major government projects are abandoned after spending vast amounts of public money, while the incompetents responsible for these failures continue to be seen as software experts.

So it is true that we can be corrupted by totalitarianism even if we don't live in a totalitarian country. But Orwell made this observation *before* we had a software elite and a software bureaucracy. To bring the observation up to date, we must say that the corruption caused by software totalitarianism can *exceed* that found in a totalitarian country. It is the *nature* of software, its similarity to language, that makes this possible: we are becoming dependent on software in practically every activity; and if at the same time we are being restricted to *mechanistic* software concepts, it is only natural that we are increasingly thinking like machines. The incompetence, the irresponsibility, the apathy, the delusions we suffer from – this is exactly what we should expect to find in a society where people are prevented from using their minds.



It should be obvious, then, why I chose Talmon's and Orwell's models of totalitarianism. While dealing with political matters, their generality makes them equally suitable for the study of *software* matters. All we have to do is substitute software for politics, and these models will depict *software* totalitarianism. In the past, only a political elite had sufficient power to control society. No one could have imagined that one day we would invent something as potent as software, and that we would permit an elite to control it. Thus, if the software elite has the same power as a political elite, it is not surprising that our software ideology can be depicted with political models.

Another fact explained by the two models is why modern societies, founded upon liberal and democratic principles, end up nevertheless drifting toward totalitarianism. The reason is that the modernity which engenders democracy tempts us at the same time to accept blindly all mechanistic notions. Because of its successes in the exact sciences, we also see mechanism as the answer to our political, social, and economic problems. An elite can gain our support, therefore, by promising us simple, mechanistic solutions to these problems. So mechanism leads to utopianism: the belief that the methods we use in science and in engineering can help us to create a perfect society. But the only way to make a mechanistic ideology work is by enforcing conformism. Utopianism, thus, leads to totalitarianism: since a mechanistic ideology does not reflect

human nature, we must be modified to match the ideology. Still, the elite says, this is not coercion but education. The ideology is based on scientific principles; so, if we accept science we must also accept totalitarianism. In a modern, efficient society, preferring individuality to conformism is a sign of maladjustment.

It makes little difference, thus, what type of mechanistic ideology one starts with – political, religious, business, educational, or software; if implemented on a large scale, it is guaranteed to become totalitarian. And this is why the same model can depict any type of totalitarianism. To demonstrate this kinship for software, I include below a passage from Talmon's book – the text where he describes the difference between the liberal and the totalitarian types of democracy (we discussed this earlier, see pp. 848–849). Read the passage, however, by substituting the word “software” for the twelve occurrences of “politics” and “political” (which I emphasized). And, with this change, the text describes perfectly our totalitarian *software* ideology.

The essential difference between the two schools of democratic thought as they have evolved is not, as is often alleged, in the affirmation of the value of liberty by one, and its denial by the other. It is in their different attitudes to *politics*. The liberal approach assumes *politics* to be a matter of trial and error, and regards *political* systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity. It also recognizes a variety of levels of personal and collective endeavour, which are altogether outside the sphere of *politics*.

The totalitarian democratic school, on the other hand, is based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in *politics*. It may be called *political* Messianism in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive. It recognizes ultimately only one plane of existence, the *political*. It widens the scope of *politics* to embrace the whole of human existence. It treats all human thought and action as having social significance, and therefore as falling within the orbit of *political* action. Its *political* ideas are not a set of pragmatic precepts or a body of devices applicable to a special branch of human endeavour. They are an integral part of an all-embracing and coherent philosophy. *Politics* is defined as the art of applying this philosophy to the organization of society, and the final purpose of *politics* is only achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 1–2 (italics added). A similar effect is achieved if substituting “software” for politics-related or language-related words in Orwell's writings (the quotations on pp. 863 and 870, for instance).

Let us analyze these statements. The “sole and exclusive truth” in software is the ideology of software mechanism; in particular, the belief that software is a kind of product, so the most effective way to create and use software is through the devices supplied by software companies. Just like the political theories, the software theories are defended by invoking their mechanistic foundation. Mechanism is invalid both in politics and in software, and its failure in these domains is obvious. But if we accept blindly the mechanistic ideology, we must also accept mechanistic political and software systems.

The state “to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive” is the state where software mechanism is universally accepted, and no other form of programming or software use is envisaged. And software messianism is the belief that such a state is imminent: at any given moment, the latest concept, theory, or system is perceived as the revolution that would finally deliver us from all software evils. Recall the notion of a general will – the hidden, natural qualities said to inhere in all of us (p. 851): by enforcing conformism, the political elite will bring out these superior qualities, and thereby create a perfect society. Similarly, we may call the mechanistic software concepts a general *software* will. We all possess from birth such qualities as the appreciation of ready-made applications, high-level environments, and graphic user interface. But these natural, superior qualities are masked by the inefficient habits we acquire as individuals. So, by enforcing software conformism, the software elite helps us to attain our natural, higher self. The secret for becoming perfect programmers and users is an unwavering acceptance of the mechanistic software ideology.

Similarly to its political counterpart, the *liberal* software view recognizes “a variety of levels of personal and collective endeavour” for which software devices are ineffective, or unnecessary; and the *totalitarian* software view recognizes “only one plane of existence,” our software-dependent activities. Under *political* totalitarianism, all social and personal affairs are modified to reflect the prevailing ideology, in order to permit the elite to directly control the life of every citizen. But to make this possible, the scope of politics is extended to encompass every aspect of human life. Politics, therefore, becomes more important than it ought to be. It grows into an exaggerated, morbid preoccupation, and every other activity in society is made subordinate to it. Under *software* totalitarianism, it is software – as expressed through the mechanistic ideology – that becomes more important than it ought to be, and grows into a morbid preoccupation. The scope of software is extended “to embrace the whole of human existence.”

Thus, by invoking progress, or efficiency, or standards, the software elite attempts to replace every type of human knowledge with a software device. The only thing we need to know from now on, we are told, is how to operate these

devices. Through these devices, then, the elite directly controls our capabilities, our values, our beliefs. The notion of personal skills and experience is becoming obsolete, as we are all expected to accomplish about the same thing: whatever can be done by combining the features found in the latest software devices. Instead of using our time to gain knowledge and experience, we waste it with software-related preoccupations; instead of using it to solve real professional and personal problems, we waste it solving specious, software-related problems.

The software elite treats software, thus, not as “a set of pragmatic precepts or a body of devices applicable to a special branch of human endeavour,” but as “an integral part of an all-embracing and coherent philosophy” – the mechanistic philosophy. More precisely, software is seen as “the art of applying this philosophy to the organization of society.” The elite treats software, in other words, not as what it really is – the means to represent the world with computers – but as a way to control society. And it does this by enforcing the mechanistic software ideology; specifically, by making us dependent on software devices. Since this kind of software cannot solve our real, complex problems, we end up spending more and more time with senseless pursuits. Simply by inducing us to squander our time on useless activities, then, the elite ensures our permanent ignorance; and this in turn ensures a growing dependence on software devices, in a process that feeds on itself. But “the final purpose” of software will only be achieved “when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life”; that is, when every aspect of human existence is controlled through software devices.

